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This chapter offers an introduction to naturalist views in contemporary metaethics.1 Such views 
attempt to find a place for normative properties (such as goodness and rightness) in the concrete 
physical world as it is understood by both science and common sense. The chapter begins by 
introducing simple naturalist conceptual analyses of normative terms. It then explains how these 
analyses were rejected in the beginning of the 20th century due to G.E. Moore’s influential open 
question argument. 
After this, the chapter considers what good general reasons there are for defending 
naturalism in metaethics. The bulk of the chapter will then survey new semantic and 
metaphysical forms of naturalism, which in different ways attempt to address Moore’s objection. 
These more recent versions of naturalism – using new resources from philosophy of language, 
philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and epistemology – attempt to explain 
why the open question argument fails. 
 
Naturalist Conceptual Analyses of Normative Terms 
The paradigmatic method of philosophical investigation has traditionally been conceptual 
analysis.2 When philosophers use this method, they are attempting to capture in simpler terms 
what a person means when she uses a more complicated term. It is natural to think that what a 
																																								 																				
1 Metaethics is the study of the nature of normative judgments and normative properties and the meaning of 
normative language. This is to be contrasted with normative ethics, which studies questions such as which actions 
are right and wrong. 
2 For different ways to understand conceptual analysis and a detailed historical overview of its use throughout the 
history of philosophy, see Beaney (2014). 
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person means when she says that “Tom is a bachelor” is that Tom is both male and unmarried. 
Likewise, by calling an animal “a vixen,” you mean that it is female and a fox. Conceptual 
analyses thus attempt to capture the meaning of more complicated terms with definitions that 
unpack their meaning into simpler terms. These analyses claim, for instance, that a bachelor is by 
definition an unmarried male and a vixen is by definition a female fox. 
Philosophers tend to be interested in terms that are more central parts of our language 
than “bachelor” and “vixen.” One essential part of language which philosophers are interested in 
includes moral, evaluative, and normative terms. This is the area of language that we use when 
we discuss what is good and bad; which actions are right and wrong; what we ought to do; what 
we have reasons to do; what is just, courageous, evil, beautiful, and so on. We also use these 
terms in our own practical deliberations that lead us to act. 
Historically, there have been many attempts to offer conceptual analyses of the central 
normative terms. It has been suggested, for example, that if you say that “It is good to have a 
job,” what you really mean is that you desire to have a job;3 this suggested conceptual analysis of 
the term “good” unpacks the meaning of this analyzed term in terms of the simple idea of what 
you desire. Likewise, it has been suggested that if I say that an act is “right” what I really mean 
in simpler terms is that the act brings about more pleasure for everyone than anything else that I 
could do.4 According to this analysis, the correct definition of the term “right,” which captures its 
meaning, is “What brings about more pleasure for everyone than anything else an agent could do 
in her situation.” 
These simple analyses of “good” and “right” try to explain what these terms mean by 
talking about only ordinary, easily understandable things like desires and pleasure. Since there is 
nothing mysterious about human desires or the experience of pleasure, these analyses also 
explain how we could come to know what is good or right. These analyses furthermore say 
nothing about God or God’s plans. In this sense, it is easy to call these analyses naturalist 
analyses of “good” and “right,” in contrast to supernatural analyses, which would make sense of 
the meaning of “good” and “right” in terms of, say, God’s will. 
																																								 																				
3 Thomas Hobbes is often interpreted to have endorsed this definition in Leviathan (see Hobbes 1651/1994, I.6). 
Whether this was his intention remains controversial. 
4 This analysis is often attributed to John Stuart Mill (1871/1998, 59). 
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Moore’s Open Question Argument 
Despite the attractions of naturalist explanations of the meanings of normative terms, many 
philosophers are suspicious of them. This line of thought is already present in the work of 
Richard Price (1723–1791), Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), 
Thomas Reid (1710–1796), and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900).5 It culminates in G.E. Moore’s 
open question argument, which Moore formulated in his Principia Ethica (Moore 1903/1993, §§ 
11–14). In their arguments against naturalist analyses of normative terms, Moore and the other 
philosophers before him rely on an intuitive standard for when an analysis successfully captures 
what a speaker means when she uses a given term. 
To see how this test works, consider the previous example of the term “vixen.” I 
suggested that when a competent speaker uses this term to describe an animal, what she means is 
that the animal is female and a fox. Moore observed that if this definition really captures what 
the speaker means, then the speaker should not be able to begin to consider the question “X is a 
female fox, but is X a vixen?” This is a closed question for the speaker, because she both means 
“female fox” by the word “vixen” and has already concluded that X is a female fox. Thus, it 
would make no sense for her to begin to wonder whether the female fox is also a vixen. As a 
consequence, Moore suggested that successful analyses always lead to closed questions that have 
the form of the previous question. 
Moore then used this test to argue that there cannot be any successful definitions of 
normative words in naturalist terms. Consider the two analyses previously suggested: “good” 
means what you desire and “right” means what brings about more pleasure than anything else 
that you could do. Moore argued that competent speakers can always begin to consider how to 
answer the following questions: “I desire X, but is X good?” and “X brings about more pleasure 
than any of the other alternatives, but is X right?” From this observation, he concluded that being 
what we desire or what brings about more pleasure than other alternatives cannot therefore be 
what we mean when we use the words “good” and “right.” In fact, Moore concluded from these 
examples that no naturalistic analyses of normative terms could ever capture what the users of 
																																								 																				5	For references, see Korsgaard (2008, 307, fn. 23). See also Sidgwick (1907, bk. 1, ch. 3). 
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these terms mean, because the relevant questions we get from these analyses will always remain 
open. 
Moore’s argument was incredibly important for the development of modern metaethics. 
One reason for this is that Moore concluded from his argument that the normative terms must, as 
a consequence of the open questions, refer to non-natural properties of their own unique kind.6 
With this, Moore single-handedly introduced the standard terminology and dividing lines for 
naturalism versus non-naturalism debates in metaethics. Non-naturalists defend the Moorean 
view according to which normative properties are in some fundamental sense of a different kind 
than the other, more ordinary properties that objects, actions, and states of affairs are usually 
thought to have. In contrast, naturalists in metaethics think that normative properties are 
fundamentally of the same kind as other ordinary properties. 
 
Natural and Non-Natural Properties 
After Moore’s groundbreaking work, it has proven difficult to specify accurately the difference 
between natural and non-natural properties. There are three main ways to draw the distinction. 
The first way to draw it is to begin from the observation that we can  use our senses to observe 
which objects have ordinary properties and which don’t. We can see the shape of a car, hear how 
far a bird is from us, and feel how heavy a bag is. The suggestion, then, is that natural properties 
are all those properties that are empirically observable in this way, whereas whether something 
has a non-natural property must be known in some other way (Copp 2003). 
The second holds that ordinary properties are a part of the causal network of the world. 
For example, the steepness of a hill causes a ball to roll down and the speed of a bullet causes a 
lot of damage inside a human body. The claim, then, is that natural properties are all those 
properties that are a part of these sorts of causal chain. The having of these properties can both 
be a consequence of other events that take place in the real world and it can also cause other 
things to happen. A defining feature of non-natural properties is that they are in some sense 
outside the causal network of the physical world (Lewis 1983, § 2). 
																																								 																				
6 For an insightful investigation of Moore’s conclusion, see Dreier (2006). 
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The third is to argue that natural properties are special because scientists rely on these 
properties in the best systematic explanations of what happens in the world (Little 1994; Shafer-
Landau 2006, 211). As a consequence, because physics relies on properties such as spin and 
charge in its most fundamental explanations, these properties are natural properties. The claim, 
then, is that the properties that are not used in systematic scientific explanations are for this 
reason of a different kind than natural properties. Such properties are non-natural properties. 
These three ways of distinguishing natural properties from non-natural properties have 
their own problems. They do suggest, however, that at the heart of the disagreement between 
naturalists and non-naturalists is the question of whether morality is autonomous from empirical 
and scientific investigation. 
I have already explained why G.E. Moore believed that the meaning of normative terms 
cannot be analyzed in simpler terms which refer to ordinary natural properties. I also mentioned 
that Moore concluded from the open question argument that unanalyzable normative terms must 
therefore refer to simple non-natural properties of their own unique kind. Most developments in 
metaethics during the 20th and the early 21st centuries can be understood as reactions to Moore’s 
open question argument. The advantages of naturalism provided a powerful motive for 
developing innovative and sophisticated naturalist theories of normative terms and properties 
that could address Moore’s objection to naturalism. Before I introduce these new forms of 
naturalism, I will first explain the advantages. 
 
General Arguments for Naturalism in Metaethics 
There are at least four good reasons for preferring naturalism7 in metaethics over the Moorean 
alternatives that are committed to the existence of additional non-natural properties. The strength 
of these reasons explains in part the ingenuity of the naturalist responses to Moore. 
First of all, metaphysical parsimony is an attractive methodological principle in all 
scientific theorizing.8 The basic idea of this principle is that we should always look for the 
																																								 																				
7 By “naturalism,” I mean substantive naturalism: a view about normative concepts and properties. Methodological 
naturalism, in contrast, is the view that philosophy (ethics included) should proceed by a posteriori empirical 
investigation. See Railton (1989, 155–157). 
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simplest theoretical explanations of the events we observe: the kinds of explanation that rely on 
the fewest possible objects, properties, and laws. Simple explanations have proven to be 
incredibly powerful, which is why the principle of parsimony has such as good track record. The 
simple explanations of science help us to predict successfully what happens across a wide variety 
of different contexts. This has led to the rejection of our reliance on spirits or magic in our 
explanations and predictions, and it is why we have made genuine intellectual progress. 
Because the goal of aiming at metaphysical parsimony has served science so well, we 
should also rely on this principle in other domains of rational inquiry (including philosophy). 
Unless it is necessary, we should also avoid positing new kinds of property to explain reality. 
This is a powerful reason for not adding any non-natural properties to our worldview. 
The second reason for preferring naturalism has to do with how we can know about 
normative properties.9 As already explained, naturalists believe that normative properties are 
exactly like other ordinary properties. When it comes to those properties, there is a relatively 
simple and unproblematic explanation for how we know about them: centrally, ordinary natural 
properties causally impact our senses. I can know that the book on my desk is rectangular 
because the photons it reflects hit my retina, which is sensitive to these particles. Through this 
causal process, I come to see the shape of the book, and through this perception, I reliably come 
to know that the book is rectangular. 
Because naturalists believe that normative properties are like other ordinary properties, 
they claim that we can know which objects, actions, and states of affairs have these properties by 
the same empirical methods. For naturalists, normative properties are a part of the causal 
network of the world, and for this reason naturalists claim that we can observe normative facts as 
we do all other facts. 
If you believe that normative properties are non-natural, however, it will be difficult for 
you to explain how we come to know about them. Nonnatural properties (1) cannot be observed, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
8 This principle is sometimes called Occam’s razor. For an overview of its role and its attractions in philosophical 
and scientific theorizing, see Baker (2010). 
9 For locus classicus, see Mackie (1977, 38). For a more recent powerful development of the argument, see (Bedke 
2009). 
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(2) are not part of the causal nexus of the world, and (3) are not used in the best scientific 
explanations. These features of non-natural properties rule out using both our senses and science 
in knowing when an act is good or right. Non-naturalists must defend a priori methods in the 
epistemology of normative properties. While they often talk about self-evident normative 
principles that we discover through pure a priori reasoning, it is unclear how such reasoning is 
sensitive to the non-natural properties that non-naturalists believe are part of the furniture of the 
world.10 
Third, it is equally difficult for non-naturalists to explain how normative terms came to 
refer to non-natural properties. In most cases, our words refer to certain objects and substances at 
least in part because we causally interact with them (Putnam 1975; Kripke 1980). We drink and 
bathe in a certain liquid, which at some point in human history we named “water.” This causal 
connection explains how the word “water” came to refer to the substance it refers to. In the same 
way, a certain baby was named “John F. Kennedy.” Through the interaction between that baby 
and the people who gave him his name, that name came to have its reference. The names of 
substances and individuals, then, refer to specific substances and individuals (rather than to some 
other substances and individuals) because we are in a causal contact with them when we 
introduce the names. 
If we cannot causally interact with alleged non-natural normative properties, then there 
will have to be some other explanation for how the word “right” came to refer to the property of 
rightness (rather than to some other property). With the exception of Ralph Wedgwood’s recent 
work (2007, ch. 4), however, non-naturalists have failed to explain how words come to refer to 
the relevant non-natural properties. An important advantage of naturalist views in metaethics is 
that their reliance on causal connections ensures that normative terms refer to the right 
properties. 
																																								 																				
10 See Bedke (2009). Devitt (2010) develops general arguments against a priori knowledge. For non-naturalist 
responses to these worries, see, for example, Audi (2005), Shafer-Landau (2003, pt. 5), Wedgwood (2007, pt. 3), 
and Enoch (2011, ch. 7). 
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The final advantage of naturalism is the failure of non-naturalists to explain how 
normative properties supervene on natural properties.11 In order to unpack this abstract idea, we 
can begin from the thought that it seems obvious that if two actions are identical in all their 
ordinary natural features, they are also the same normatively speaking: equally good and right. 
However, if normative properties were distinct and additional properties of their own unique 
kind, it would be difficult to explain why different instances of otherwise identical actions could 
not have different normative properties. Naturalists, in contrast, have again an easy answer to 
this challenge. They, after all, claim that normative properties belong to the set of ordinary 
natural properties, and therefore it is trivially true that there is no difference in the normative 
properties that two actions have without a difference in their ordinary natural properties. 
To summarize, there are a number of powerful reasons for accepting a naturalistic theory 
of normative terms and properties. The strong intuitions behind Moore’s open question argument 
also give us an idea of what a satisfactory naturalistic view in metaethics would look like. It 
would need to explain, for example, why it seems that when we talk about what is good or right, 
we are not merely talking about what we desire or what brings about the most pleasure. How 
different naturalist views have reacted to this intuition helps us to classify the new forms of 
naturalism in metaethics. We will first look at naturalist responses to Moore that focus on 
normative terms. Following this, we will consider views that focus on the nature of the 
normative properties. 
 
Semantic Forms of Naturalism in Metaethics 
In this section, I will introduce different forms of naturalism which attempt both (1) to capture 
the meaning of normative language in broadly naturalist terms and (2) to address Moore’s 
concern that such analyses fail because they lead to open questions. I will first outline the 
expressivist response to Moore’s open question argument. I will then explain how simple 
																																								 																				11	This	 objection	was	 first	made	by	 Simon	Blackburn	 (1993a,b).	 For	 a	non-naturalist	 response,	 see	 Shafer-Landau	 (2003,	84–89).	Frank	 Jackson	has	argued	 that	 supervenience	 itself	 collapses	any	additional	 alleged	non-natural	 properties	 to	 the	 base-level	 natural	 properties	 (1998,	 122–123).	 For	 a	 critical	 investigation	 of	this	argument,	see	Suikkanen	(2010).	
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reductive naturalist analyses of normative terms could be defended against Moore’s argument by 
taking into account pragmatic considerations that influence our willingness to use these terms. 
Finally, I will outline Frank Jackson’s network analyses of normative terms. 
 
Expressivism as a Version of Naturalism in Metaethics 
Soon after the publication of Principia Ethica, philosophers started to consider why we have the 
intuition that, whatever natural properties an act has, it still remains an open question whether 
that act is right. One insightful answer to this question came from philosophers who defended 
early versions of expressivism (Ayer 1936, 106–110; Hare 1952, 94–110). 
Expressivists hold that there is a necessary connection between thinking that an act is 
good and desiring to do that act.12 Many people intuitively believe that you cannot sincerely 
conclude that it is good to help other people unless you also have at least some desire to do so. In 
order to explain this internal connection between normative judgments and motivation, 
expressivists believe, roughly, that thinking that an act is good consists itself in a desire to do 
that act (rather than believing that the act has a normative property).13 Expressivists also claim 
that the meaning of the sentence “X is good” can be analyzed wholly in terms of the desire-like 
attitudes for doing X that this sentence conventionally expresses. 
Expressivists use this theory to provide an illuminating explanation of why Moorean 
questions always remain open. When I judge that an act brings about more pleasure than its 
alternatives, I form a belief of a natural property that the act in question has: I believe that this 
act has the property of bringing about a lot of pleasure. According to expressivists, judging that 
an act is good also requires having a desire to do that act. However, no belief about what natural 
properties an act has can itself settle what I desire. Knowing that it is sunny outside does not 
move me to go outside, unless I want to be in the sun. This desire is always something distinct 
from knowing that it is sunny. Forming a desire to do something is therefore something 
																																								 																				
12 This thesis is usually called “judgment internalism.” For a clear overview of the debates concerning this thesis, 
see Björklund et al. (2012). 
13 For representative recent expressivist texts, see Blackburn (1998), Gibbard (2003), and Schroeder (2008). 
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additional that I must always do after I have formed the relevant beliefs about the situation I am 
in. 
According to expressivists, the additional motivation required when using normative 
terms explains why questions of the form “X is N, but is it good?” always remain open, no 
matter what natural property N is. When you ask that form of question, you are considering 
whether you want to do X when you know that X has the property of being N. Whatever natural 
property N is, thinking about this always makes sense, which is why Moorean questions will 
always remain open. 
Expressivism is a naturalist view, and therefore it shares the general advantages of 
naturalism (Blackburn 1984; 1998, 49).14 Expressivists give a fully naturalist explanation of 
which mental states constitute normative judgments, and this account does not require the 
existence of any non-natural properties. In fact, all that is required to make sense of normative 
judgments, according to expressivists, is ordinary, desire-like attitudes, which are commonly 
recognized in the human sciences, such as psychology and economics. 
When metaethicists discuss naturalism, they typically have in mind cognitivist views, 
according to which normative judgments are ordinary beliefs about natural properties. 
Naturalism in metaethics, then, is assumed to be a form of cognitivism. But cognitivism is in 
conflict with noncognitivist expressivism. While expressivists endorse a fully naturalist 
worldview, they reject the typical cognitivist assumption. 
So far, I have only explained what expressivists think about the nature of normative 
judgments; I have not said anything about what they think about normative properties. The 
reason for this is both (1) that what normative properties are like is less important from the 
expressivist perspective and (2) that expressivists disagree about this issue. Some expressivists 
think that normative properties are metaphysically lightweight “projections” of our desire-like 
attitudes (Blackburn 1993c, 55–60). While these “shadow properties” are in one sense of their 
own unique kind (and so “non-natural”), they lack the kind of ontological weight which non-
naturalist realists assume that normative properties have. 
																																								 																				
14 In the same way, it should be emphasized that moral error theory too is a form of naturalism. On this view, 
semantically normative claims presuppose the existence of non-natural properties, but, metaphysically speaking, 
there are no such properties which make the normative claims false (see Mackie 1977). 
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The standard way to illustrate this view is by analogy to the property of being disgusting. 
In the order of explanation, the reaction of being disgusted by different objects comes first. 
When we talk about disgusting things, we project our reaction of disgust on to those things. In 
the same way, many expressivists think that we react to the world by forming different desire-
like attitudes. When we talk about normative properties, we project these reactions on to 
different actions and states of affairs in the same way as in the case of disgusting things. As a 
consequence, normative properties are shadows of our desire-like attitudes. 
Other expressivists think that normative properties are ordinary natural properties 
(Gibbard 2003, ch. 5).15 We can again illustrate this view with the example of disgusting things. 
As a consequence of projecting our reactions of disgust on to wordly objects consistently, there 
will be a complex natural property that is coextensive with things deemed disgusting. This can be 
the property of having the property P or the property Q or the property R and so on, where the 
predicates “P,” “Q,” “R,” and so on describe in detail the natural properties of each and every 
instance of a disgusting thing. So, roughly, it’s the property of being a rotten egg, or a case of 
incest, or similar. One view of the property of being disgusting, then, is that it is constituted by 
the underlying coextensive natural property, which can take a form of infinitely long disjunction. 
Some expressivists believe that, in the same way, normative terms refer to an underlying, 
perhaps disjunctive natural property that is coextensive with the set of good things or right 
things. The property of being right can, on this expressivist view, be roughly the property of 
being a case of helping an old person across the street, or giving money to charity, or not stealing 
from someone, and so on. It is just that when we talk about this natural property by using 
normative terms such as “right,” we are expressing our desire toward doing actions that have this 







Implicatures and Know-How 
In this subsection, I will introduce two attempts to defend simple naturalist reductive analyses of 
normative terms with the help of recent developments in the philosophy of language. The first 
view is based on the distinction between what a word means literally (semantics) and what can 
be done in practice by using that word (pragmatics). The second view is based on the distinction 
between propositional knowledge and skills. 
To illustrate the first distinction, we can use Paul Grice’s classic example of a linguistic 
phenomenon he calls “a conventional implicature” (1989, 46). Consider the following sentences: 
 
(1) Alice is poor but she is honest 
(2) Alice is poor and she is honest 
 
The first observation we should make about these two sentences is that they are true in exactly 
the same situations: both are true when Alice is both poor and honest (it is attractive to 
understand what a sentence means in terms of the conditions in which it is true).16 If we accept 
this simple idea, then we are led to think that the literal meanings of both (1) and (2) are exactly 
the same. 
Despite this, we would not want to utter these sentences in exactly the same situations. 
The reason for this is that (1) communicates a further thought which (2) doesn’t. In practice, the 
use of “but” in (1) suggests that poor people are not usually honest. The sentence does not say 
this literally, but if you were to use it in discussion you would communicate this thought to your 
audience. This example suggests that many words and utterances imply things that are not part of 
their literal meaning. 
																																								 																				16	Truth-conditional semantics culminate in the work of Donald Davidson. See the essays collected in Davidson 
(1984). 
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It is possible to use this idea to defend simple naturalist analyses of normative terms 
against Moore.17 Let us assume that expressivists are correct about why we think that questions 
of the form “X is N, but is X good?” are open questions: because uttering the word “good” 
commits you to desiring X, whereas thinking that X is N does not commit you to this desire, 
whatever natural property N is. If we accept that words and sentences can imply things that are 
not part of their literal meaning, then naturalists can argue that using the word “good” commits 
you to having certain desires because using this word implies that you have them (and not 
because the relevant desires have anything to do with the literal meaning of the word). 
To see how this works, let us return to the claim that “right” means whatever brings about 
the most pleasure. Why is the question “X brings about most pleasure, but is X right?” an open 
question? The naturalist response to Moore is that merely describing an act as the one that brings 
about most pleasure does not commit you to desiring anything, whereas saying that this act is 
right implies that you want to do X. Accordingly, the utterance that “X is right” would have this 
implication even if, in saying that X is right, one literally meant that X brings about most 
pleasure. This then explains why you can hesitate to call an act that brings about most pleasure 
right even if by saying that it is you mean that it brings about the most pleasure. Saying that the 
act is right, despite its literal meaning, implies something about your own motivations. 
This response to the open question argument leaves the naturalist with one important 
task. There are many candidates for a naturalist analysis of normative words. “Right” could mean 
“whatever brings about most pleasure” or “what society accepts” or any number of other things. 
Naturalists owe us a plausible theory of which one of these analyses we should accept. 
One problem is that the practical implicature response to the open question argument 
means that what we would say about individual cases is not a reliable indication of what we 
literally mean when we use normative terms. After all, our willingness to use these terms is also 
influenced by the implicatures these terms carry with them in concrete situations. This is why 
naturalists must give us an account of how we are to determine what these words mean without 
relying on our intuitions about individual cases. One suggestion is that we should look at general 
																																								 																				
17 Proposals along these lines have been defended, for example, by David Copp (2001) and Stephen Finlay (2005). 
Copp believes that normative utterances conventionally implicate desire-like attitudes, whereas according to Finlay 
the implicatures in question are conversational implicatures. 
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empirical semantic theories investigated in linguistics. These theories might be able to tell us 
what literal meanings normative terms must have in order to explain how these terms combine 
with other linguistic expressions to form meaningful sentences across different contexts.18 
There is also a second way in which relatively simple naturalist analyses of normative 
terms have been defended against Moore’s open question argument. This second proposal begins 
from the idea that we do not learn new terms in the form of explicit definitions when we grow up 
(Smith 1994, 37–38). For example, when I learned to use the word “car” correctly, I did not learn 
this word as a definition of the form “X is a car if and only if X has four wheels, an engine,…” 
Rather, I become a competent user of this term by acquiring the skill of classifying objects into 
two categories (those that are cars and those that are not). When I rely on this skill as a speaker, I 
needn’t have any explicit definition in mind, even if I do make use of some implicit standards 
that constitute my conceptual competence with the word in question. 
This idea can be used to construct an attractive response to the open question argument. It 
can explain why a speaker can begin to consider the question “X is N, but is X good?” even 
when what she means by saying “X is good” is that X is N (Smith 1994, 36–38). When a speaker 
utters the sentence “X is good,” she is relying on the skill of being able to classify things 
according to certain implicit standards, which she learned in the form of know-how when she 
was growing up. What these standards are will not be transparent for the speaker. It can turn out 
that she is classifying things as “good” by relying implicitly on the standard “Is X N?” In this 
case, by calling things “good,” she would mean that these things are N, even if she might not be 
aware of this. Likewise, by calling an act “right,” a speaker may well be categorizing it as one 
that brings about the most pleasure even if she is not aware that she is using this standard. This is 
why Moore’s questions of the form “X is N, but is X good?” can remain open even if the 
definitions from which they are formed correctly capture what the speaker implicitly means. 
If naturalists give this response to the open question argument, they still need to explain 
how we can discover what criteria speakers are implicitly using to classify things, and thus what 
constitutes the meaning of the terms they use. One suggestion is that, if we let speakers reflect 
																																								 																				18	On the basis of this type of consideration, Stephen Finlay has suggested that the literal meaning of “good” in a 
given sentence can, for example, be analyzed in terms of the promotiveness of an end which is specified by the 
context of utterance (2014, ch. 2). 
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carefully enough on what role the analyzed terms play in their lives and how they use them, they 
should be able to discover what standards they are relying on implicitly when they use those 
terms (Smith 1994, 38). 
Michael Smith has used this idea to construct a naturalist theory of the meaning of 
normative terms. According to Smith, one fundamental part of the role of normative terms is that 
making judgments with these terms creates requirements of rationality (1994, ch. 3). Roughly, on 
Smith’s view, if you think that doing an act is good, then either you desire to do that act or you 
are being practically irrational.19 Smith then thinks that when we analyze normative terms like 
“good,” we should find definitions that help us to explain why these terms create the previous 
type requirements of rationality. Smith concludes that when you say that we have a normative 
reason to do a certain act in a certain context, what you mean is that more rational (more 
informed, unified, and coherent) versions of us would want us to do that act in that context 
(1994, ch. 5). This naturalist analysis of the term “normative reason” might then explain the role 
which this term has in our deliberations, and might also be something that we can identify as the 
implicit standard we use in considering what we have reason to do. 
 
Network Analysis 
Frank Jackson has argued that, even if we cannot give simple naturalist analyses of normative 
terms, we can still reductively analyze normative language as a whole in a naturalist fashion 
(1998, ch. 5). According to this view, we will not be able to find naturalist definitions of the form 
“To be good is by definition to be N,” where “N” is something simple like “what we desire” or 
“what brings about most pleasure.” Jackson argues that, despite this, we can capture the whole 
network of normative terms in naturalist terms. 
Jackson offers a simple recipe for how the more sophisticated naturalist network analyses 
of normative terms can be constructed. According to Jackson, normative terms form an 
interrelated network of concepts. The place a given normative term has in this network 
determines both (1) the meaning of that term and (2) what a competent speaker must understand 
about that term (Jackson 1998, 129–130). 
																																								 																				
19 This thesis is a form of conditional judgment internalism (Björklund et al. 2012, § 2). 
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At the first stage of Jackson’s analysis, we collect all platitudes that, for example, have to do 
with “right.” These trivial claims connect this term to other normative concepts. They might 
include claims such as: 
• If someone judges that X is right, she is disposed to do X. 
• If one person says that X is right and another person that it isn’t, then at most one of them 
is correct. 
• Right actions in some sense express equal concern and respect to everyone. 
• Right actions tend to have good consequences. 
• …(Jackson 1998, 130–131; see also Smith 1994, 39–41) 
From this, we can form a very long conjunction of all the platitudes that connect “right” to other 
normative and non-normative terms. This conjunction will look like this: 
1. (If someone judges that X is right, she is disposed to do X) and (if one person says that X 
is right and another person that it isn’t, then at most one of them is correct) and (right 
actions in some sense express equal concern and respect to everyone) and (right actions 
tend to have good consequences) and… (Jackson 1998, 140) 
After this, we can replace all instances of normative property words in (1) with variables. As a 
consequence, we get: 
2. (x, y, z,…) (If someone judges that X is x, she is disposed to do X) and (if one person says 
that X is x and another person that it isn’t, then at most one of them is correct) and (x 
actions in some sense express y to everyone) and (x actions tend to have z consequences) 
and… 
If we in addition claim that properties x, y, z,… specified by (2) exist and that they exist 
uniquely, we get the following:20 
3. There are (x, y, z,...) and for all (x*, y*, z*…) [(If someone judges that X is x, she is 
disposed to do X) and (if one person says that X is x and another person that it isn’t, then 
																																								 																				
20 This is called a Ramsey sentence, because Frank Ramsey relied on similar sentences in an attempt to represent the 
empirical content of scientific theories (Ramsey 1978). 
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at most one of them is correct) and (x actions in some sense express y to everyone) 
and…] and [((if someone judges that X is x*, she is disposed to do X) and (if one person 
says that X is x* and another person that it isn’t, then at most one of them is correct) and 
(x* actions in some sense express y* to everyone) and…) if and only if (x is identical 
with x* and y is identical with y* and…). (Jackson 1998, 140) 
This sentence is formulated in purely naturalist terms. It can be used to offer an a priori 
reductivist naturalist analysis of the term “right.” According to this analysis, rightness is by 
definition the unique natural property that is related to other properties exactly in the way that the 
big conjunction of platitudes tells us that normative properties are related to one another (Smith 
1994, 45–46). 
The thought behind this complicated analysis is simple. The role that the word “right” 
plays in our ordinary normative discourse is like a symbol on a map. A map picks out the place 
of a specific location by specifying how the location is related to all the other locations shown. In 
the same way, this analysis of the term “right” picks out a certain natural property by specifying 
how that property is related to other properties in ordinary language and thinking. 
This form of naturalism thus enables us to define normative terms as terms that refer to 
the unique natural properties (whatever they may be) that play the role defined by the place of 
those terms in the whole network of normative concepts. It is then a matter of further empirical 
research to discover which particular natural properties the concepts in the whole network of 
normative concepts refer to. It is true that we could form a relevant open question from the 
previous definition of “right” which speakers could begin to consider. However, Jackson argues 
that this definition will only create open questions, because speakers can always be hesitant 
about whether the discovered analysis based on the network of platitudes is correct. Given how 
complicated the network analysis is, it is no wonder that it will not be apparent for the speakers 
that this definition correctly captures what “right” means.21 
 
																																								 																				
21 One objection to Jackson’s moral functionalism is that the network of platitudes in the case of normative concepts 
is not rich enough to pick out unique natural properties as the referents of these terms. For this permutation problem, 
see Smith (1994, 48–54). 
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Synthetic Forms of Naturalism in Metaethics 
All the naturalist views introduced so far have focused on normative terms and language. They 
all attempt to show that, in one way or another, normative terms can be defined in non-normative 
language that refers only to ordinary natural properties. However, there is another alternative. 
Many metaethicists have recently attempted to naturalize normative properties directly on the 
level of metaphysics without offering naturalist semantic analyses of normative terms.22 This 
new project was made possible by new developments in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and 
philosophy of language during the second half of the 20th century. 
The so-called synthetic naturalists in metaethics think that even if normative terms cannot 
be defined in simpler naturalist terms, normative properties can still be natural properties. 
Nonreductive synthetic naturalists believe that normative properties are natural properties of 
their own, whereas reductive synthetic naturalists think that normative properties are reducible to 
other natural properties.23 
We can start approaching these views from the idea that, in a sense, the new synthetic 
forms of naturalism accept the first conclusion of Moore’s open question argument (there are no 
correct definitions of normative terms) but reject the second one (therefore, these terms refer to 
non-natural properties). When Moore was writing, this combination was not a real option, 
because it was thought that the meaning of a word determined its reference. If you accept this 
principle of Frege’s philosophy of language (1892/1997, 152), then it is tempting to assume that, 
if two terms differ in meaning, they must refer to different properties. However, Hilary Putnam 
(1975) and Saul Kripke (1980) famously argued that there is no reason to accept Frege’s 
principle. They showed that there can be two terms that have different meanings which 
nonetheless refer to the same individual or substance in all possible worlds. It is easy to use 
scientific identity statements to illustrate this idea.24 
																																								 																				
22 These philosophers include Richard Boyd (1988), Nicholas Sturgeon (1988), David Brink (1989), and Mark 
Schroeder (2007, ch. 4). Because the first philosophers defending the theory worked at Cornell at the time, synthetic 
forms of naturalism are often called “Cornell realism” in metaethics. 
23 Sturgeon (1988, 239–241) is an example of a nonreductivist synthetic naturalist, whereas Schroeder (2007, 61) is 
a clear example of a reductivist synthetic naturalist. 
24 Naturalists in metaethics who use this scientific identity analogy include Boyd (1988, 196) and Brink (1989, 157).	
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According to scientists, water is H2O molecules. Despite this metaphysical identity, 
“water” and “H2O” have different meanings. When you explain the meaning of “water,” you will 
say things like “Water is a transparent, tasteless liquid,” “It falls from the sky and fills lakes and 
rivers,” and so on. In contrast, the meaning of the theoretical term “H2O” has something to do 
with how hydrogen and oxygen atoms can form larger molecules. Kripke and Putnam’s crucial 
observation was that not everything that is a sample of a transparent, tasteless liquid that falls 
from the sky and fills lakes and rivers will be water. We can imagine a planet where we find a 
substance that is like this but is not H2O (but rather has some other chemical constitution, XYZ). 
The samples of this substance will intuitively not be water, because we only count H2O as water. 
This means that here we have a case where two terms that differ in meaning refer to the very 
same substance in all worlds. 
This analogy creates logical room for the new synthetic forms of naturalism in 
metaethics. These views hold that even if the predicates “good” and “N” differ in meaning, they 
can still refer to exactly the same natural property N across all worlds.25 That is, goodness can be 
identical with the property of being N even if this identity is not based on the meanings of the 
relevant words. As a result of this possibility, Moore can be right that the meaning of normative 
words cannot be captured in simpler terms and yet wrong about normative properties being 
distinct non-natural properties. This is why the traditional open question argument cannot be 
used as an objection to the new synthetic forms of naturalism. 
All of this, of course, leaves synthetic naturalists with the question: Which natural 
properties exactly do constitute normative properties metaphysically? According to Cornell 
realists, in the same way that we use the best overall science of our day to determine which 
substance is water, we should also rely on the best overall ethical theory to determine which 
natural properties constitute normative properties. If the simple utilitarian ethical theory (right 
actions maximize the amount of pleasure) turns out to be true according to the best theory, then 
the natural property of maximizing pleasure constitutes the property of rightness. 
																																								 																				25	 This	 view	 is	most	 clearly	 defended	 by	 Boyd	 (1988),	 Brink	 (1989),	 and	 Schroeder	 (2007).	 Peter	 Railton	(1986)	 has	 suggested	 that	 once	we	 find	 a	 naturalist	 property	 that	 plays	 the	 role	 specified	 by	 an	 ordinary	normative	term,	we	can	revise	the	meaning	of	that	term	so	that	it	will	mean	the	same	as	the	non-normative	terms	that	pick	out	that	property.	
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  How do we know which ethical theory is the best? At this point, Cornell realists are 
inspired by the epistemological debates in philosophy of science. Quine argued convincingly that 
individual elements of scientific theories or even complete theories cannot be empirically tested 
by observations (1969, 79). What the observations show will always depend on many 
background assumptions outside them. This is because, by making corrections somewhere else in 
your web of beliefs, you can always make your theory fit what you observe. For this reason, 
Quine thought that we can only test worldviews against observations holistically (in their 
entirety). 
The new forms of synthetic naturalism in metaethics borrow this form of coherentism 
from the philosophy of science.26 They state that we should first attempt to seek a wide reflective 
equilibrium between our intuitions about cases, general moral principles, and, more broadly, 
common-sense beliefs and scientific theories about the world. The best overall theory we arrive 
at as a result of this procedure will then tell us which natural properties constitute normative 
properties. 
Finally, the development of the previous type of synthetic naturalism in metaethics led to 
an important debate about the nature of normative properties. I have already suggested that one 
important criterion for whether a given property is a natural property is whether the property can 
play a role in systematic causal explanations. Some people additionally think that we should 
believe in the existence of only those properties that are indispensable in causal explanations. 
Gilbert Harman argued against the new forms of naturalism in metaethics by relying on this 
principle and the claim that normative properties are not needed in the best causal explanations 
(1977, ch. 1). 
Harman compares two cases. In one, a scientist sees a vapor-trail in a cloud chamber and, 
on the basis of this observation and her background theoretical beliefs, infers, “There goes a 
proton.” Harman claims that, in this case, the best explanation of the scientist’s observation must 
																																								 																				26	See,	for	example,	Boyd	(1988,	191–192)	and	Brink	(1989,	ch.	5).	Some	metaphysicians	consider	this	type	commitment	to	Quinean	confirmation-holism	to	be	a	defining	feature	of	naturalism	(Devitt	2010,	274).	The	coherentist	methodology	also	 fits	nicely	with	the	view	that	normative	terms	refer	 to	 the	natural	properties	that	best	explain	our	use	of	those	terms	(Boyd	1988,	195).	
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refer to the proton itself, which then is just one reason why we should believe that the proton 
exists. Without the proton, there would not have been an observation. 
In the second case, a group of hoodlums sets a cat on fire, which leads a passer-by to 
judge, “That is wrong!” As in the previous case, without her background ethical theory of which 
actions are wrong, the passer-by would not have made this observation. However, Harman 
argues that there is no need to refer to the property of wrongness at all in the best causal 
explanation of the moral judgment. All we need to refer to in that explanation is how the passer-
by’s upbringing has made her disapprove of burning cats. And, because we do not need to refer 
to the wrongness of the act to explain the observation, according to Harman, there is no reason to 
believe that there is such a property in the first place. 
Nicholas Sturgeon’s (1988) response to this challenge played a big role in the 
development of new forms of naturalism in metaethics. Sturgeon begins with the idea that the 
challenge creates an interesting objection to the existence of normative properties only if it 
shows that those properties would not play a causal role even if they existed (or otherwise the 
objection would beg the question). This is why, when we think about the cat-burning case, we 
are allowed to assume that there are normative properties. Sturgeon then argues that, if we are 
allowed to assume that there are normative properties, these can be used in informative causal 
explanations of our observations and other events. 
One example of a good moral explanation is the following: Hitler ordered the deaths of 
millions of Jews because he was morally depraved (Sturgeon 1988, 234). In this case, the fact of 
Hitler’s depraved nature would be explanatorily irrelevant only if he would have ordered the 
deaths of millions of Jews even in the counterfactual situation in which he was not morally 
depraved. According to Sturgeon, the naturalist view Harman is objecting to is based on the idea 
that Hitler’s moral depravity is constituted by his non-normative natural properties: by his 
racism, insensitivity to other people’s suffering, and so on (1988, 245–246). This means that, if 
Hitler had not been morally depraved, he would have been a very different kind of person with 
respect to his non-normative natural properties. In this situation, he probably would not have 
ordered the deaths of millions of Jews, and therefore it seems like we can use normative 
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properties in informative causal explanations. This is a good reason to believe that these 
properties do exist and that they are natural properties.27 
Sturgeon’s naturalist defense of normative properties against Harman’s explanatory 
challenge led to a fruitful debate about moral explanations. Harman (1986) responded that the 
counterfactual Sturgeon used to test the relevant explanations was too permissive. It would 
mean, for example, that there was no logical room for moral epiphenomenalism: the view that 
Hitler’s non-normative character traits explain both his actions and why he was morally 
depraved even if his morally depraved nature doesn’t explain anything. After all, defenders of 
this view could not deny that, if Hitler had been morally different, he might not have done what 
he did. Because moral epiphenomenalism is a consistent view, Harman argues that the truth of 
the counterfactual “had X not been P, then Y would not have happened” is not sufficient to make 
property P explanatory. In response to this objection, naturalists have attempted to find other 
ways in which higher-order normative properties could be necessary for the best causal 
explanations even if they are not themselves causally efficacious.28 These views attempt to 
vindicate the view that normative properties are real natural properties by showing that these 
properties are indispensable in the best causal explanations in some more sophisticated way than 
that Sturgeon initially assumed. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined how the general advantages of naturalist views in metaethics led 
to the development of new, sophisticated forms of semantic and synthetic naturalism in response 
to Moore’s open question argument. The debates about these new forms of naturalism are one 
important reason why so much progress has been made in metaethics during the last 50 years or 
																																								 																				
27 Sturgeon also uses this argument to motivate his nonreductivist form of naturalism. It is not necessary that the 
extension of the normative property that does the explanatory work (and is thus natural) can be picked out with non-
normative terms that refer to other natural properties. 
28 The best example of an attempt to address Harman’s further objection is Jackson and Pettit’s (1990) notion of 
program explanations. For a clear overview of the whole debate about moral explanations and naturalism, see Miller 
(2013, ch. 8). 
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so. Furthermore, at some point toward the end of the 20th century, as a consequence of these 
developments, naturalism seems to have become the default view in Anglo-American academic 
metaethics. 
More recently, non-naturalism has made a comeback.29 There are several reasons for this. 
First, the new forms of naturalism outlined in this chapter continue to be critically debated, 
because each faces significant theoretical challenges of its own. Second, some non-naturalists 
continue to argue that naturalist views in metaethics have implausible first-order normative 
consequences. For example, the so-called particularists claim that these views cannot account for 
the complicated way in which whether some consideration is a reason for an act depends on its 
context (Dancy 2004, ch. 4). Others insist that naturalist views cannot explain why we have 
reason to care about our future suffering independently of what we care about currently (Parfit 
2011, chs. 3 and 24–30). 
The third challenge to naturalism is based on the moral twin-earth cases (Hare 1952, 
146–149; Horgan and Timmons 1990). This objection is based on the idea that naturalists must 
describe a causal mechanism that fixes the reference of normative terms to the relevant natural 
properties. We can then imagine cases in which this mechanism fixes the reference of a 
normative term to different properties in different communities. If naturalism were true, it would 
follow from this that these communities would thereafter lack shared concepts with which to 
have normative disagreements. Some people find this awkward consequence a good enough 
reason to reject naturalism. Finally, it is also argued that, perhaps with the exception of 
expressivism, the new forms of naturalism are still unable to explain the close connection 
between normative thinking and motivation (Wedgwood 2007, ch. 3). The debate between 
naturalists and non-naturalists is therefore unlikely to go away any time soon. 
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